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E-mail address: brsheth@uh.edu (B.R. Sheth).The effect of emotion on visual awareness is largely unknown. Pairs of natural images were presented
side by side on a screen in a binocular rivalry setup. The amount of time that each image of a pair dom-
inated perception was computed. Our results showed:
(A) A main effect of arousal: Dominance durations of the more arousing picture of iso-valence pairs
were longer. (B) No effect of valence: Dominance durations of pleasant and unpleasant pictures of iso-
arousal pairs were similar. (C) An interaction between arousal and valence: The more pleasant picture
of iso-arousal pairs of low arousal level dominated conscious perception. The less pleasant picture of
iso-arousal pairs of high arousal level dominated conscious perception. Our ﬁndings suggest that the
emotional content of a stimulus affects the extent to which it dominates awareness. While arousal and
valence interactively affect access to awareness, only arousal exerts an independent control of such
access.
 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Recent studies have found that emotion modulates perception.
For instance, emotional stimuli often attract attention (Most, Chun,
Widders, & Zald, 2005). Aversive stimuli can modulate attention to
such a degree that they impair the perception of subsequently pre-
sented neutral, or non-emotional, targets. Not only that, temporary
visual deﬁcits can be induced by otherwise neutral distractors
whose aversive associations have only recently been learned
(Smith, Most, Newsome, & Zald, 2006). Emotion potentiates the ef-
fect of attention on sensitivity to stimulus contrast (Phelps, Ling, &
Carrasco, 2006): Performance on an orientation discrimination
task, is modestly but signiﬁcantly better when the oriented target
at near-threshold contrast follows a fearful face cue rather than a
neutral face cue.
Research on the neural mechanisms underlying the emotional
modulation of attention implicates the amygdala, a medial tempo-
ral lobe structure known to be involved in the enhanced perception
of emotional events (Anderson & Phelps, 2001). The amygdala re-
sponds to the emotional content of an event rapidly (LeDoux,
2002). Not only that, the amygdala is known to respond to emo-
tional content prior to awareness (Whalen et al., 1998). There is
now behavioral evidence indicating that emotional content alters
contrast processing, a feature of low-level vision (Phelps et al.,
2006). In light of recent neural evidence that the amygdala projectsll rights reserved.to visual cortex (Kapp, Supple, & Whalen, 1994; LeDoux, 2002) and
evidence that awareness does not arise in the primary visual cortex
(Crick & Koch, 1995; He & MacLeod, 2001; Jiang, Zhou, & He, 2007),
we hypothesize that the emotional content of a visual stimulus is
capable of affecting its processing even before it reaches
awareness.
This hypothesis has been previously tested using a classical bin-
ocular rivalry paradigm (Alpers & Gerdes, 2007; Alpers & Pauli,
2006; Yang, Zald, & Blake, 2007). In this paradigm, two disparate
images are presented simultaneously to the corresponding location
in each of the two eyes. Under this condition of ambiguous visual
input, the observer is more likely to see one image rather than a
superposition of the two. That is to say, exactly one image of the
pair will be consciously perceived at a given time. After a few sec-
onds, the previously suppressed image will be perceived (or be-
come dominant) and then the two rival images will continue to
cycle between suppression and dominance in a quasi-regular fash-
ion. Using this paradigm, Coren and Russell (1992) showed that
faces with extreme emotions dominated over faces without. Oga-
wa and Suzuki (2000) reported that fusion in this paradigm de-
pended on the similarity of emotions in the two images: Fusion
was easier to obtain with images of similar emotions. More re-
cently, Alpers and Pauli (2006) extended these results to non-facial
images and showed that emotional images signiﬁcantly dominated
relative to neutral images. The same pattern of results has been re-
ported by Alpers and Gerdes (2007) and Yang et al. (2007). In sum,
several studies have shown that, emotional images predominate
over unemotional or neutral ones.
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but rather has long been known to consist of multiple dimensions
(Mehrabian & Russell, 1974; Tellegen, 1985; Wundt, 1896). For in-
stance, valence (affect) is a separate dimension of emotional con-
tent from arousal (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1999; Osgood, Suci,
& Tannenbaum, 1957): Pleasant images can be either non-arousing
(e.g.s, pictures of a young girl reading a book, a ﬂock of parrots, or a
school of brightly colored ﬁsh) or highly arousing (e.g.s, pictures of
a romantic or erotic couple, a roller-coaster, or people playing and
enjoying a sport such as windsurﬁng or skiing). Similarly, unpleas-
ant images can be either non-arousing (e.g.s, pictures of a ceme-
tery, a hospital, or an arguing couple) or highly arousing (e.g.s,
pictures of a baby with a tumor, severed hand, or a burn victim).
The studies cited above did not address how these two dimensions
separately or jointly inﬂuence access to visual awareness. This
study was designed to speciﬁcally address this question.
Observers in the study dichoptically viewed pictures selected
from the International Affective Picture System, or IAPS, an image-
base whose pictures have been pre-rated for emotional arousal and
valence (affect) (Lang et al., 1999). Speciﬁcally, we asked if the
arousal level of a picture (arousing vs. non-arousing) inﬂuences
its access to visual awareness. We expect arousing images to sup-
press non-arousing ones and have higher priority access to visual
awareness. We also asked if the valence of an image inﬂuences
its access to awareness. In our opinion, unpleasant pictures ought
to have higher priority to awareness than pleasant ones because
potentially, objects of negative valence negatively affect one’s bio-
logical ﬁtness or even threaten one’s very survival; furthermore,
studies of visual search have shown that unpleasant facial expres-
sions are easier to ﬁnd than pleasant ones (Hansen & Hansen,
1988).2. Materials and methods
2.1. Participants
Participants were eighteen healthy volunteers (9 female) from
the University of Houston (age: 21.6 ± 0.6 years, age range: 18–
27) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision, who were naïve
as to the purpose of the study. Data from six observers were dis-
carded because of a computer glitch discovered later. The study
was approved by the local human studies committee of the Univer-
sity of Houston, and participants provided written informed
consent.
2.2. Stimuli
Images were selected from the International Affective Picture
System (IAPS) database (Lang et al., 1999), which provides ratings
of affect for a large set of emotionally evocative, internationally
accessible, color photographs that includes contents across a wide
range of semantic categories. Pictures were selected and paired
such that either (a) the pictures comprising a pair were very sim-
ilar in image content but differed dramatically in arousal and va-
lence rating, or (b) the pictures comprising a pair were tightly
matched for valence or arousal, but not both. IAPS mean valence
ratings of the pictures constituting a given iso-valence pair could
not differ by more than 0.2 points on a 9-point valence rating scale.
Similarly, IAPS mean arousal ratings of the pictures constituting a
given iso-arousal pair could not differ by more than 0.2 points on
a 9-point arousal rating scale. Fifty four picture pairs were created
that satisﬁed one of the two criteria. Each picture (108 = 54  2
pictures total) belonged to just one pair. The picture pairs were
presented in two sessions, typically separated by a week.
Observers had never seen any of the pictures prior to their run.2.3. Procedure
Picture pairs were presented on a NEC MultiSync LCD 2090UXi
monitor (1600  1200 pixels resolution, 75 Hz refresh) viewed
through a mirror stereoscope for a continuous duration of 60 s
(1 min). Pictures subtended 1.78  1.34 of visual angle at a view-
ing distance of 78 cm, and each picture was bordered by a thin,
high contrast, oriented border in order to rapidly help bring the
two eyes into alignment. Observers sat comfortably in a chair
and viewed the monitor through a careful arrangement of mirrors
adjusted individually for each observer so that the left picture on
the screen projected exclusively to the left eye and the right pic-
ture to the right. The monocular images stimulated corresponding
areas of the retinae and therefore converged upon the same por-
tion of the binocular ﬁeld. The participant’s head was stabilized
by a chinrest (Headspot). Software was programmed and pre-
sented using MATLAB (Mathworks, Inc.) and the Psychophysics
toolbox extensions (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). Every 15 s of the
60-s. long trial, the two pictures switched location, so that both
eyes saw each picture of the pair for an equal 30 s. This design con-
straint, in addition to the constraint that the initial picture loca-
tions were counterbalanced across our observer set, effectively
reduced whatever bias arising from eye preference that could have
existed in the data. Participants continually reported, by hitting the
corresponding key on a computer keyboard, their ongoing con-
scious percept throughout the 60-s display period, and in particu-
lar, as soon as a transition occurred in their perception. They could
also report a superposition of both pictures, or mixed dominance,
and were explicitly encouraged to report as such unless one of
the pictures thoroughly dominated perception. Therefore, at all
times, the observer had three choices—total dominance of either
picture or a superposition of both. The relatively small size of the
pictures reduced the possibility that the observer would perceive
a superposition (Logothetis & Schall, 1990). Observers reported
mixed dominance for over more than one third of the total display
duration on 55% of trials.
2.4. Data analysis
For each comparison, we analyzed two variables – (a) predo-
minance, or total dominance duration and (b) initial image percept.
We explain their meanings using a high vs. low arousal image pair
for illustration. Predominance, or total dominance duration, is the
total time during the course of the trial that an observer reports
perceiving a particular image of the pair (say, the low arousal
image). Averaging across all high vs. low arousal image pairs, we
obtained low vs. high arousal dominance durations for each
individual observer. Second, we kept track of the initial picture
perceived of the pair, which corresponded to the ﬁrst key in the
response sequence. Summing this across all high vs. low arousal
image pairs, we calculated the probability that a given observer
initially perceived the low arousal picture or the high arousal
picture. All pairwise statistical comparisons used a two-tailed
paired student’s t-test.
2.5. Image analysis
For each picture used in the study, we computed the value of
key low-level stimulus measures using custom software scripted
in MATLAB. Speciﬁcally, we measured local (contrast) as well as
global (mean, kurtosis, entropy, and spectral composition) image
properties.
(a)Mean luminance and kurtosis of luminance distribution: To our
knowledge, there is no widely accepted standard way to character-
ize the distribution of pixel luminance values across a complex,
natural scene. We measured two features of the luminance
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each RGB intensity level was measured using a photometer and
from that, the calibrated luminance of each pixel was computed.
In this way, we measured the average of the distribution of cali-
brated luminances across all the pixels of a given image. To quan-
tify variability in the luminance distribution, we measured its
kurtosis, which is the ratio of the fourth central moment of the dis-
tribution of pixel intensities and the standard deviation to the
fourth power (Pearson, 1905). Kurtosis measures the degree of
peakedness of a distribution (a normal distribution has a kurtosis
of zero; a uniform distribution has negative kurtosis), and is sensi-
tive to extreme deviations in luminance in any local part of an
image.
(b) Entropy—This is Shannon entropy in bits/pixel of the distri-
bution of pixel intensities. It is a quantitative measure of image
complexity.
(c) Contrast—Natural images of reasonable complexity have
unclearly delineated, heterogeneous ﬁgure and ground. Therefore,
classical measures of image contrast (Weber contrast, Michelson
contrast) cannot be applied to our images. Instead, we used a mea-
sure derived from (Sonka, Vaclav, & Boyle, 2007) to compute image
contrast: At each inter-pixel distance ([1, 5] pixels), a histogram of
contrast, viz. difference in intensity between all pairs of pixels, was
computed along the two cardinal and two oblique orientations. The
mean contrast at a given inter-pixel distance by the sum of all lev-
els of contrast at that distance weighted by the proportion of pixel
pairs at each level of contrast. Next, three separate directionally
isotropic measures were derived—(i) contrastnearestneighbor, which
is the mean difference in intensity of adjacent pixels, (ii) con-
trastweighted, which is a weighted sum of the difference in intensity
of neighboring pairs of pixels 1? 5 pixels apart. The weights line-
arly decrease with inter-pixel distance, (iii) contrastmax, which is
the maximum difference in intensity among pairs of pixels be-
tween 1 and 5 pixels apart.
(d) Spectral composition—Amplitude spectra in the range 0–10
cycles per degree or cpd (Robson, 1966) were computed for each
image. Although all our images subtended the same viewing area,
each had a variable number of pixels (note that the images com-
prising a given pair were required to have the same number of pix-
els) and thus variable spatial sampling frequency. In order to
standardize across images, a uniform frequency resolution of 0.5
cpd was used for computation of the amplitude spectra.
3. Results
We ﬁrst inquired if there was a difference in the conscious per-
ception of pairs of images that differed signiﬁcantly along both
dimensions—arousal and affect (valence)—of emotional content
(Table 1). Observers (n = 12) viewed seven pairs of pictures for
1 min each and, during this period, continually reported what they
perceived. The two pictures of the pair were largely similar to each
other but differed in a single detail (e.g. identical face either smil-
ing or bloodied). The difference in stimulus content between the
two pictures is what caused the valence and arousal ratings of
the otherwise similar pictures to diverge: One picture of the pairTable 1
Arousing, unpleasant images vs. non-arousing, pleasant images—perception measures, em
Measures of conscious perception (observer means,
n = 12)
Arousing, unpleasant images
A
Duration of perceptual Dominance (s) 25.95 ± 1.52
First image perceived (fraction of trials) 0.56 ± 0.04
Emotion ratings (image means, n = 7) Mean ± 1 SD
Valence ratings (IAPS) 2.3 ± 0.5
Arousal ratings (IAPS) 5.8 ± 0.9
*, statistical signiﬁcance; ns; not signiﬁcant.had a low arousal rating and high valence rating, which respec-
tively signify non-arousing and pleasant; the other had a high
arousal rating and low valence rating, which respectively signify
arousing and unpleasant. We sought to determine if variation in
emotional content affected access to conscious awareness, namely
if the high arousal, low valence picture or the low arousal, high va-
lence picture of the test pair predominated, i.e. was exclusively vis-
ible over a larger proportion of the 60-s long viewing period.
Observers reported seeing the arousing, unpleasant image of
the pair (Fig. 1A, red bar) for a signiﬁcantly longer duration than
the non-arousing, pleasant image over the 60-s total viewing per-
iod (Fig. 1A, black bar; 25.95 s vs. 19.63 s, p = 0.007; Table 1; Dur-
ing the remaining viewing period, observers reported a mixture of
both pictures, termed piecemeal rivalry; mixtures were not ana-
lyzed any further). In order to understand how the difference in
predominance between the two image classes evolves over time,
we re-sampled the data at 1 s. intervals and re-plotted the time
courses of predominance, or total dominance duration, of the
two image classes in Fig. 1B. Fig. 1B shows that the difference in to-
tal duration of perceptual dominance did not begin until 15 s or so
into the presentation, and the difference gradually increased over
the remainder of the 60-s viewing period. The arousing, unpleasant
picture was not necessarily the initial one perceived (56% of trials
across all observers; Table 1). Thus, the initial period of rivalry did
not exclusively determine perception in subsequent epochs; this
result is also in accord with the claim that onset rivalry and sus-
tained rivalry are different from, and perhaps independent of,
one another (Carter & Cavanagh, 2007). In sum, arousal and/or va-
lence—two different dimensions of emotion—control access to
awareness during the sustained period of rivalry.
We isolated each of the two dimensions one by one. First, we in-
quired if there was a difference in the conscious perception of pairs
of images that differed signiﬁcantly in level of arousal but negligi-
bly along the other dimension of affect (iso-valence pairs; Table 2).
We reasoned that if arousal were the dimension that governed ac-
cess of the previous image set to visual awareness, observers
would report seeing highly arousing images more often and over
a longer duration than less arousing images. We used a new set
of iso-valence images (17 pairs) for this test. The variation in va-
lence across iso-valence pairs in the set was relatively low (see Ta-
ble 2). Observers reported perceiving the more arousing image of
the iso-valence pair for a signiﬁcantly longer duration (22.93 s vs.
18.24 s, p < 0.0001; Fig. 2A, Table 2). The difference in dominance
duration ﬁrst appeared 10–15 s following image pair onset and
monotonically increased with time (Fig. 2B). High and low arous-
ing pictures were each perceived ﬁrst on the same proportion
(50%) of trials (Table 2); therefore, for iso-valence image pairs as
well, perception in the initial phase of the rivalry had little control
over perception in the sustained period of rivalry.
Next, we inquired if there was a difference in the conscious per-
ception of pairs of images that differed signiﬁcantly in affect (va-
lence) but negligibly in arousal level (Fig. 3A, Table 3). Valence
did not appear to play a role in perceptual dominance: Observers
reported seeing the unpleasant versus pleasant images of the pair
(30 image pairs total) for about the same amount of time (17.86 sotion ratings
mean ± 1 SEM Non-arousing, pleasant images mean ± 1 SEM
B
p-Value A vs. B
19.63 ± 1.07 0.007*
0.44 ± 0.04 ns
Mean ± 1 SD
6.2 ± 0.9 <0.0001*
4.7 ± 0.3 0.007*
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Fig. 1. Combined effect of arousal and valence (affect) on the duration of conscious
perception. (A) Group mean durations of perceptual dominance of the set of
arousing, unpleasant images (red bar) versus non-arousing, pleasant images (black
bar). Each pair of pictures was simultaneously presented for a total of 60 s. Each bar
represents the time duration in which the corresponding picture category was
exclusively perceived. A combination of both was perceived over the remainder of
the duration. Error bars represent one SEM. (B) Group dynamics of perceptual
dominance as a function of ongoing trial duration (0? 60 s) are shown. Red and
black solid lines, respectively, represent the evolution of perceptual dominance of
the set of arousing, unpleasant images and the set of non-arousing, pleasant images.
The dotted line represents a 50–50 duty cycle. Dominance durations are cumulative
over the 60-s viewing period. Error bars represent one SEM. (For interpretation of
the references in colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web
version of this article.)
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Fig. 2. Effect of arousal on the duration of conscious perception. (A) Group mean
durations of perceptual dominance of the set of arousing (red bar) versus non-
arousing images (black bar). The two image sets were equated for affect, and
differed signiﬁcantly in arousal level. Error bars represent one SEM. (B) Group
dynamics of perceptual dominance are shown as a function of ongoing trial
duration (0? 60 s). The red solid line represents the evolution of perceptual
dominance of the set of arousing images, and the black solid line the evolution of
dominance of the set of non-arousing images. (For interpretation of the references
in colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this
article.)
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the dynamics of perceptual dominance revealed that the lack of
difference was consistent across time following stimulus onset
(Fig. 3B). In other words, it was not the case that a difference in
duration between low (unpleasant) and high valence images wasTable 2
Arousing images vs. non-arousing (low arousal) images—perception measures, emotion ra
Measures of conscious perception (observer means, n = 12) Arousing images me
Duration of perceptual Dominance (s) 22.93 ± 1.14
First image perceived (fraction of trials) 0.50 ± 0.04
Emotion ratings (image means, n = 17) Mean ± 1 SD
Valence ratings (IAPS) 5.7 ± 1.3
Arousal ratings (IAPS) 6.5 ± 0.5
*, statistical signiﬁcance; ns; not signiﬁcant.present at some early time following onset, but then dissipated
with sustained exposure.
Given that there is a signiﬁcant effect of arousal on total domi-
nance duration (see Fig. 2), we reasoned that if any effects of va-
lence (affect) on conscious perception were present, they would
be subsumed by the more powerful effect of arousal. Note that
the iso-arousal pairs had relatively high between-pair variance in
arousal rating (see Table 3), which facilitated study of thetings
an ± 1 SEM A Non-arousing images mean ± 1 SEM B p-Value A vs. B
18.24 ± 0.86 0.0001*
0.50 ± 0.04 ns
Mean ± 1 SD
5.7 ± 1.3 0.28, ns
2.8 ± 0.6 <0.0001*
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Fig. 3. Effect of valence (affect) on the duration of conscious perception. (A) Group
mean durations of perceptual dominance of the set of unpleasant (blue bar) versus
pleasant images (green bar). The two image sets were equated for arousal level, and
differed signiﬁcantly in valence (affect). Error bars represent one SEM. (B) Group
dynamics of perceptual dominance are shown for the unpleasant (blue solid line)
and pleasant (green solid line) images as a function of ongoing trial duration
(0? 60 s). (For interpretation of the references in colour in this ﬁgure legend, the
reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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Fig. 4. Interaction between arousal and valence (affect). (A) Group mean durations
of perceptual dominance of the set of unpleasant, non-arousing images (blue bar)
versus pleasant, arousing images (green bar). The two image sets were equated for
low arousal levels and differed signiﬁcantly only in affect. Error bars signify one
SEM. (B) Group mean durations of perceptual dominance of the set of unpleasant,
arousing images (blue bar) versus pleasant, arousing images (green bar). The two
image sets were equated for high arousal levels and differed signiﬁcantly only in
valence (affect). (For interpretation of the references in colour in this ﬁgure legend,
the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
B.R. Sheth, T. Pham /Vision Research 48 (2008) 2415–2424 2419interaction between the effects of valence and arousal on percep-
tual dominance (see Fig. 4). In a post-hoc analysis, we classiﬁed
the thirty iso-arousal image pairs into two categories—low or high
arousal level, and measured the effect of valence on each arousal-
based category separately.
On the low arousal level iso-arousal image pairs, observers re-
ported perceiving the more pleasant image of the pair over signif-
icantly longer total durations (unpleasant vs. pleasant—16.97 s vs.
20.57 s, p = 0.004; Fig. 4A, Table 4). On the other hand, on the highTable 3
Unpleasant images vs. pleasant images —perception measures, emotion ratings
Measures of conscious perception (observer means, n = 12) Unpleasant images
Duration of perceptual dominance (s) 17.86 ± 1.54
First image perceived (fraction of trials) 0.48 ± 0.02
Emotion ratings (image means, n = 30) Mean ± 1 SD
Valence ratings (IAPS) 3.3 ± 1.1
Arousal ratings (IAPS) 4.7 ± 1.9
*, statistical signiﬁcance; ns; not signiﬁcant.arousal level iso-arousal image pairs, observers reported perceiv-
ing the more unpleasant image of the pair over signiﬁcantly longer
total durations (18.63 s vs. 16.52 s, p = 0.043; Fig. 4B, Table 4). Va-
lence (affect) had opposite effects for low and high arousal iso-
arousal image pairs, which is probably why there was no main ef-
fect of valence.
3.1. Effect of low-level stimulus measures on rivalry
Manipulation of stimulus variables such as luminance (Fox &
Rasche, 1969; Kakizaki, 1960), contrast (Hollins, 1980a; Whittle,mean ± 1 SEM A Pleasant images mean ± 1 SEM B p-Value A vs. B
18.41 ± 1.42 >0.4, ns
0.51 ± 0.02 ns
Mean ± 1 SD
7.0 ± 1.1 <0.0001*
4.7 ± 1.9 >0.6, ns
Table 4
Unpleasant, low/high arousal images vs. Pleasant, low/high arousal images—perception measures, emotion ratings
Measures of conscious perception
(observer means, n = 12)
Unpleasant, low arousal
images mean ± 1 SEM A
Pleasant, low arousal
images mean ± 1 SEM B
p-Value
A vs. B
Unpleasant, high arousal
images mean ± 1 SEM A
Pleasant, high arousal
images mean ± 1 SEM B
p-Value
A vs. B
Duration of perceptual dominance (s) 16.97 ± 1.63 20.57 ± 1.63 0.004* 18.63 ± 1.57 16.52 ± 1.39 0.043*
First image perceived (fraction of trials) 0.42 ± 0.03 0.58 ± 0.03 0.02* 0.54 ± 0.04 0.45 ± 0.03 >0.2, ns
Emotion ratings (image means) Mean ± 1 SD Mean ± 1 SD Mean ± 1 SD Mean ± 1 SD
Valence ratings 3.9 ± 0.9 7.1 ± 0.6 <0.0001* 2.7 ± 0.8 7.0 ± 1.3 <0.0001*
Arousal ratings 3.7 ± 0.5 3.7 ± 0.5 > 0.4, ns 5.6 ± 0.8 5.6 ± 0.8 >0.9, ns
*, statistical signiﬁcance; ns; not signiﬁcant.
1 It is worth pointing out that Alais and Melcher (2007) showed that it is not image
complexity per se or the difference in complexity between the images of a pair, but
the level of shared complexity that governs predominance.
2420 B.R. Sheth, T. Pham /Vision Research 48 (2008) 2415–24241965), contour density (Levelt, 1965), spatial frequency (Andrews
& Purves, 1997; Fahle, 1982a, 1982b; Hollins, 1980b), image com-
plexity (Alais & Melcher, 2007), size (O’Shea, Sims, & Govan, 1997),
velocity (Blake, Yu, Lokey, & Norman, 1998; Breese, 1899;Wade, de
Weert, & Swanston, 1984) and retinal eccentricity (Fahle, 1987)
can produce pronounced variations in stimulus predominance. As
a general rule, a ‘‘stronger” rival target (e.g., one that is of higher
contrast, larger, closer to ﬁxation, more sharply focused, ﬂickering
or dynamically changing versus one that is not) dominates con-
scious perception. An important question is whether any of these
low-level stimulus measures rather than emotional content pre-
dicts predominance during rivalry.
The short answer is ‘no’: An extensive analysis of image statis-
tics found little difference in low-level stimulus measures between
pictures of discrepant emotional content. The pictures constituting
a given pair were of the exact same size, displayed at the same
eccentricity and were static natural scenes with no ﬂicker or other
dynamic properties or differences. Thus, the following three stim-
ulus measures—size, retinal eccentricity, and stimulus velocity—
had no role to play at all in our study. The results of our analysis
of some of the remaining stimulus measures—image contrast,
interestingness or image complexity, mean image intensity, image
kurtosis, and spectral composition—as a function of image class are
given in Table 5. On each of the stimulus measures, our approach
was the same: Calculate the values of each stimulus measure for
each image and statistically compare between relevant image clas-
ses (low vs. high arousal, low vs. high valence, and so on). Overall,
differences among image classes in these formal stimulus mea-
sures failed to explain the corresponding differences in total dom-
inance duration. For instance, high arousal images had signiﬁcantly
longer total dominance durations than low arousal ones; however,
there was no signiﬁcant difference in low-level stimulus measures
between the two classes. Similarly, pleasant, low arousal images
were perceived for signiﬁcantly longer total durations than
unpleasant, low arousal images of similarly low arousal value,
but there was not a signiﬁcant difference in low-level stimulus
measures between them. The measures are brieﬂy described below
and results are shown in Table 5.
We calculated three different measures of image contrast (Son-
ka et al., 2007) (see Section 2.5) and computed the mean value of
contrast for each class of pictures (low arousal, high arousal, nega-
tive valence, and so on). Irrespective of measure, differences in im-
age contrast failed to account for the differences in total
dominance duration (Table 5). Another stimulus factor we investi-
gated was luminance; we wondered if there were differences in
luminance statistics as a function of image class that might explain
our ﬁndings. For this purpose, we derived two statistics for each of
our images from its luminance distribution—mean (and median)
and kurtosis, which measure, respectively, the average (median)
luminance across a given image, and extreme deviations in local
luminance within the given image (see Section 2.5). As before,
we did not observe a signiﬁcant difference in mean (or median)
luminance (p > 0.1 for each pairwise comparison; see Table 5) or
image kurtosis as a function of arousal or valence. Yet another
stimulus factor in rivalry is the level of interestingness (Smets,1975) or complexity (Alais & Melcher, 2007; Rogers, Rogers, & Too-
tle, 1977)1. Whereas interestingness is subjective and therefore hard
to quantify, entropy is a reasonable proxy for image complexity
(Shannon & Weaver, 1949). Again, image entropy did not differ sig-
niﬁcantly between arousing vs. non-arousing pictures or across any
of the other relevant pairwise comparisons (Table 5). The ﬁnal stim-
ulus measure we examined was spectral composition. It has been
shown that blurred patterns are suppressed by sharply focused ones,
and stimuli of limited spatial frequency (sf) range are suppressed by
patterns consisting of the whole sf-spectrum (Fahle, 1982a, 1982b).
For each of the ﬁve comparisons (arousing, unpleasant images vs.
non-arousing, pleasant images, pleasant vs. unpleasant images,
arousing vs. non-arousing images, and so on), we conducted a
two-way repeated measures ANOVA with frequency and image class
as main factors. The difference in spectral content between the im-
age classes being compared in each case was not statistically signif-
icant (Table 5; all ps > 0.1). That is to say, there were no signiﬁcant
differences in spectral power between image classes that could ac-
count for the observed differences in predominance. In brief, there
were few, minor differences in the low-level stimulus properties be-
tween image classes of different valence or arousal value and none
that could account for the observed differences in predominance.
3.2. Mean period of dominance phase
On a related but different note, arousal and valence do not be-
have like low-level stimulus measures in other important ways.
Consider the mean period of each dominance phase (predomi-
nance, or total dominance duration, is the sum of all the periods
of dominance). First, if both rival targets are bilaterally increased
in strength, the two targets will alternate in dominance more rap-
idly, leading to shorter periods of dominance, e.g. when two high
contrast gratings are viewed during rivalry, the periods of domi-
nance are shorter than when two low contrast gratings are viewed
(Levelt, 1965). If arousal and low-level stimulus measures affect
predominance similarly, then the mean period of dominance when
a pair of arousing images is viewed should be reduced relative to a
pair of non-arousing images. However, across our observers, the
mean dominance periods did not differ between our non-arousing
(8.93 ± 1.33 s) and arousing (8.54 ± 1.31 s) image pairs (p > 0.4).
Second, ‘‘stronger” stimuli tend to stay suppressed for shorter peri-
ods of time while not necessarily staying dominant for longer peri-
ods of time [e.g., (Fox & Rasche, 1969; Levelt, 1965); but see
(Bossink, Stalmeier, & De Weert, 1993; Mueller & Blake, 1989)
for evidence pointing to longer mean dominance periods, too].
However, for our iso-valence image pairs, the dominance period
of the arousing image of the pair was signiﬁcantly longer
(10.57 ± 1.28 s) than that of the non-arousing image of the pair
(8.07 ± 0.91 s; p = 0.006). Similarly, for the low arousal image pairs,
the dominance period of the ‘‘stronger” (see Fig. 4A) more pleasant
image of the pair was signiﬁcantly longer (8.96 ± 1.27 s) than that
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B.R. Sheth, T. Pham /Vision Research 48 (2008) 2415–2424 2421of the less pleasant one (7.38 ± 1.12 s; p = 0.007); for the high arou-
sal image pairs, the dominance period of the ‘‘stronger” (see
Fig. 4B) unpleasant image of the pair was signiﬁcantly longer
(8.55 ± 1.31 s) than that of the pleasant one (7.25 ± 1.13 s;
p = 0.001). In sum, the ﬁndings above suggest that the mechanisms
in the brain by which low-level stimulus measures and emotional
content affect stimulus predominance and access to visual aware-
ness differ.
4. Discussion
Consistent with other studies, our study ﬁnds that the emo-
tional content of an image is an important factor guiding the tran-
sition from unconscious to conscious perception. That is to say, in
addition to differences in formal stimulus measures such as lumi-
nance, contrast, and complexity, differences in the emotional con-
tent of rivaling images also inﬂuence which image ends up
dominating perception. Speciﬁcally, the arousal level of an image
determines the level of its access to visual awareness—the more
arousing image of an iso-valence image pair dominates conscious
perception. Arousal also interacts with valence (affect): For images
of identical, low arousal level, the more pleasant image of the iso-
arousal pair dominates perception, whereas for images of high
arousal value, the less pleasant image of the iso-arousal pair dom-
inates perception. The effects were remarkably consistent across
observer (e.g. the more arousing image of the iso-valence pair
dominated the conscious perception of 11/12 observers).
4.1. Response bias
An issue concerning research on the relationship between emo-
tion and perception is response bias, which is the proposal that
observers are, for whatever reason, biased to favor the reporting
of emotional percepts. A list of causes of response bias include
the use of self-report (Blake, 2001), the use of large images that
are prone to piecemeal rivalry (Blake, 2001), judgments that are
binary in nature (Blake, 2001), brief presentation of images result-
ing in dichoptic masking (Alpers & Gerdes, 2007), reporting after
brief binocular presentation (Coren & Russell, 1992) which is prone
to memory and response biases, verbalization of subjective percep-
tion which could bias results in favor of emotional pictures (Alpers
& Pauli, 2006), a tendency to label ambiguous percepts as emo-
tional (Alpers & Gerdes, 2007), a tendency to favor the initial (emo-
tional) percept, a tendency to favor the more emotional percept,
and awareness of researchers’ hypotheses (Alpers & Gerdes,
2007). Our study did use self-report to measure predominance.
However, we did not pair an emotional stimulus with a neutral
one unlike previous studies; in all cases, we paired an emotional
image with another emotional image (even the non-arousing
images were either pleasant or unpleasant, and not of neutral va-
lence), and images were carefully paired to be nearly equal along
a dimension of emotional (or stimulus) content. Moreover, our
images were small (see Section 2), judgments were ternary in nat-
ure (in addition, observers were strongly and explicitly encouraged
to report a mixture if either one of the images was not exclusively
dominant, see Section 2), each pair was shown for a long time, viz.
1 min., reports were concurrent with presentation, percepts in our
study were not verbalized but reported by key press, the initial
percept did not predict predominance [e.g. the more arousing im-
age was reported to be perceived ﬁrst on exactly 50% of trials; also
see (Carter & Cavanagh, 2007)] in our study, all of our observers
were naïve as to the researchers’ hypotheses and what’s more,
the study yielded at least one result that we failed to hypothesize.
Finally, our experimental design by and large precludes criterion
shifts. For instance, presentation of low arousal image pairs and
high arousal image pairs was intermixed. As we showed (Fig. 4),
2422 B.R. Sheth, T. Pham /Vision Research 48 (2008) 2415–2424the more pleasant image of low arousal pairs is predominant,
whereas the less pleasant pair of high arousal pairs is predominant.
This means that the observer would have to switch criterion from
trial to trial, which is extremely difﬁcult (Wixted & Stretch, 2000).
Therefore, from all of the above, it appears that response bias can-
not be a plausible account of our ﬁndings. Of interest, when Alpers
et al. corrected for bias in a later study (Alpers & Gerdes, 2007),
their conclusions did not change much from before, suggesting
that the effect of emotional content is quite robust and insensitive
to variations in experimental paradigm [see also (Yang et al., 2007)
for a similar conclusion].
There does remain one possibility (this does not fall under the
category of response bias): The observer prefers looking at a partic-
ular class of image and controls what (s)he consciously perceives.
This potential shortcoming is something the present study shares
with many, perhaps most, studies of rivalry. However, this short-
coming is not of serious concern, as Most researchers agree that
the rate of alternation in rivalry is not controllable by normal view-
ers; for a study on Tibetan monks, see (Carter et al., 2005). To quote
Blake (2001), ‘‘Aside from deploying oculomotor ‘‘tricks”, observers
seem unable willfully to trigger immediate switches from suppres-
sion to dominance or to hold one stimulus dominant indeﬁnitely
(Blake, 1988)”. In sum, thepreponderanceof evidencearguesagainst
the notion that response bias is a plausible account of our ﬁndings.
4.2. Different views of binocular rivalry
For simple rival stimuli such as orthogonal gratings, the propor-
tion of time in which either stimulus is exclusively visible, termed
rivalry coherence, is typically much smaller (25–30%) than that
for complex rival stimuli (60–80%) (Alais & Melcher, 2007). In
this study, we observed a high degree of rivalry coherence: Mean
coherence across the different pairwise comparisons was 60–76%.
Thus, the stimuli used here, which were small (1.78  1.34) but
notable for having strong emotional content, rivaled like coherent
visual objects of low emotional content (Alais & Melcher, 2007).
Our ﬁndings are thus concordant with the recent view of rivalry
that stimuli, and not just the two eyes, compete (Logothetis, Leo-
pold, & Sheinberg, 1996) for visual awareness. Over the years, there
have been a number of studies of binocular rivalry showing that in
addition to low-level stimulus primitives, meaning, context, and
other aspects of global organization of the stimulus strongly inﬂu-
ence predominance. For instance, it has been shown that upright
faces dominate over inverted faces (Engel, 1956), ﬁgures one has
seen before dominate over novel ﬁgures (Goryo, 1969), and Jewish
(Catholic) religious symbols dominate for Jewish (Catholic) observ-
ers (LoSciuto & Hartley, 1963). Thus, meaning, context, and other
aspects of global organization of the stimulus strongly inﬂuence
dominance duration.
Within the context of the present study, there is another way of
comparing the relative merits of the eye rivalry and stimulus riv-
alry views: Examine transitions in dominance resulting from the
interchange of images between the eyes every 15 s in our experi-
ment (Blake, Westendorf, & Overton, 1980; Logothetis et al.,
1996). If a given patternwere dominant in rivalry, moving that pat-
tern to the other eye should have no effect on its duration of dom-
inance, which normally lasts at least several seconds. But if a
region of a given eye is dominant during rivalry, swapping the ori-
entations should produce an immediate transition in dominance,
for the previously suppressed pattern would now be imaged in
the currently dominant eye (Blake et al., 1980). Regards to the
present study, we counted the number of transitions that resulted
from the interchange of images between the two eyes. Speciﬁcally,
we computed the fraction of (a) reversals, or trials in which one
image of the pair was exclusively visible before the interchange
and the second, previously suppressed image became exclusivelyvisible following the interchange, and (b) transitions, or trials in
which one image of the pair was exclusively visible prior to the
interchange but was replaced by the second picture of the pair or
by a mixture of both (piecemeal rivalry). For this analysis, we ob-
tained the proportions across all 54 image pairs for each observer.
The analysis revealed relatively small proportions of reversals and
transitions: Across observers, 3.5 ± 0.9% and 6.0 ± 1.1% of inter-
changes at the time of coherence respectively resulted in reversals
and transitions within 500 ms of the interchange; the respective
proportions were 13.3 ± 2.9% and 18.9 ± 3.5% within 1 s. of the
interchange. Thus, our results are apparently more in accord with
the stimulus rivalry view.
This does not mean that our ﬁndings contradict the eye rivalry
view. Different aspects of rivalry are likely to be governed by differ-
ent processes (Alais & Blake, 2005; Blake, 2001; Blake & Logothetis,
2002). For example, the stimulus determinants of the temporal
dynamics of rivalry are not necessarily those governing the spatial
extent of rivalry. Similarly, the processes responsible for initiation
of rivalry and selection of one eye’s input for dominance are now
believed to be different from the processes responsible for the
implementation and maintenance of dominance. Our ﬁndings are
in agreement with the above view: As far as the initiation of rivalry
is concerned, the more dominant stimulus is not perceived any
more at the onset of rivalry than the less dominant one. But as
far as the maintenance of dominance is concerned, the stronger
stimulus of the two along the emotional dimension dominates over
longer durations.
4.3. Emotion inﬂuences perception: A brief history, and our
contribution
Emotion affects the perception of low-level visual features
(Phelps et al., 2006) and modulates attention (Most et al., 2005).
Of critical importance is the fact that emotion is not a single mono-
lithic concept but consists of several related but different dimen-
sions. How these different dimensions affect perception at
conscious and unconscious levels of processing remains, by and
large, unexplored.
At the biological level, these issues are now beginning to be ex-
plored. There is a known connection between the amygdala, a
brain structure critical for emotional processing, and visual cortex
(Kapp et al., 1994; LeDoux, 2002; Vuilleumier, Richardson, Ar-
mony, Driver, & Dolan, 2004), brain areas critical for visual stimu-
lus processing. Of particular interest to the present discussion is
the ﬁnding that amygdala activation does not often differ for pos-
itively and negatively valenced stimuli (Garavan, Pendergrass,
Ross, Stein, & Risinger, 2001; Hamann & Mao, 2002): Relative to
neutral words, positive and negative emotional words elicited
greater fMRI activity in the left human amygdala; relative to a
low arousal and neutral valence picture baseline, both positively
and negatively valenced pictures elicited greater fMRI activity in
the left human amygdala and these responses did not differ from
each other (it bears mention that neither study used stimuli that
were balanced in one dimension of emotion and variable in the
other as we did). Given the established fact that the amygdala is
strongly responsive to emotional stimuli (LeDoux, 1996), the above
ﬁndings indirectly argue that rather than valence, other dimen-
sions of emotion, e.g. arousal, drive amygdala response. On the ba-
sis of our behavioral ﬁnding indicating, perhaps for the ﬁrst time,
that valence does not have access to awareness independent of
arousal, one is tempted to speculate that earlier studies may have
confounded the two variables—arousal and valence—in examining
amygdala response: Negatively valenced, or unpleasant, stimuli
can be highly arousing. However, valence and arousal are not one
and the same (all arousing stimuli are not unpleasant).
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on conscious perception but have rarely tried to tease apart the ef-
fects of valence from those of arousal. For instance, spotting a neg-
ative stimulus (angry face) among positive stimuli (happy faces)
has been shown to be easier than the other way around (Hansen
& Hansen, 1988), indicating that negatively valenced (unpleasant)
stimuli dominate over positively valenced (pleasant) ones. On the
other hand, other studies using the rivalry paradigm have shown
that both positive and negative facial expressions predominate
over neutral ones (Alpers & Gerdes, 2007). The effect with face
stimuli is consistent with our ﬁndings on emotionally laden natu-
ral scenes, but differs in a few important ways over and above the
obvious difference in choice of stimuli. In this and other previous
studies (Alpers & Gerdes, 2007; Alpers & Pauli, 2006), negative
and positive arousing stimuli were pitted against neutral, non-
arousing ones, whereas in our study, stimuli of negative and posi-
tive valence of nearly identical arousal level were directly pitted
against each other. Furthermore, stimuli of high and low arousal
of nearly identical valence were directly pitted against each other
in our study. This controlled experimental design allowed us to ar-
gue for the predominance of arousal over valence in driving access
to visual awareness. Arousing images predominate, regardless of
valence—the more arousing the image, the greater is its likelihood
to be perceived longer. Valence also has an effect on perception,
but, as we show here, only within an overarching context of
arousal. Thus, our study generalizes and extends previous ﬁndings
by teasing apart the inﬂuence of two distinct dimensions of
emotion—arousal and valence—on visual perception and access
to visual awareness.
4.4. Biological ﬁtness
The issue is if we can reasonably explain how the predominance
of arousal on visual perception, and the opposite effects on visual
perception of stimulus valence depending on low or high stimulus
arousal level, beneﬁt the organism. An arousing stimulus, by deﬁ-
nition, is one that awakens, alerts, and stimulates the nervous sys-
tem. An alert individual is one who is aware of the environment. It
is therefore reasonable for the sensory system to have evolved to
grant early ‘privilege’ to an arousing stimulus. One might also rea-
sonably posit that the arousing stimulus is processed just enough
for one to realize that but that it is arousing, but that it needs to
be processed further still in order to evaluate its effect on survival.
This would imply that it is imperative to process the more unpleas-
ant stimulus more thoroughly, because the consequences of not
processing a noxious stimulus are direr than the consequences of
not processing a pleasing one. Our ﬁnding, viz. the more unpleas-
ant picture of a high arousal pair is perceived for longer durations
dovetails nicely with the above arguments. On the other hand, if
the stimuli are not arousing and therefore, not critical to one’s ﬁt-
ness, the more pleasant stimulus is obviously more pleasurable.
With this backdrop, it is not surprising that the more pleasant pic-
ture of a low arousal pair tends to be perceived longer, as we
observed.
In sum, our study teases apart the relative effects of the arousal
versus valence levels of a stimulus on one’s awareness of it. We
propose that the arousal level of a stimulus provides the initial,
automatic, pre-conscious route to awareness; once triggered by
arousal, awareness is further modulated by stimulus valence, but
the effect of valence depends on the level of arousal. On the basis
of our ﬁndings, it is tempting to speculate that stimulus valence
is processed at a more conscious level as compared to arousal. That
there might be a dimension of emotion that can be processed with
little consciousness, while another requires more consciousness
before being processed, is an exciting idea. It would be instructive
to explore how these two dimensions of emotion are representedin the brain, how they interact in the brain, and how each affects
access to consciousness.
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